Introduction {#sec1}
============

We investigated what we believe to be the first severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) case to emerge in Egypt, a crossroads of the Middle East and Africa. Our presumptive case and confirmed cases represent among the earliest regional cases outside of Iran.^[@bib1]^ This case study illuminates global transmission dynamics and suggests how quickly infection can spread, even between countries that have relatively few non-stop flights between them.^[@bib5]^

Earliest cases in Egypt {#sec2}
=======================

A healthy 27-year-old Egyptian woman, Ms A, worked as a translator for two Chinese managers of a Japan-based designer brand whose manufacturing capacity is in China. The first manager was a 54-year-old female, Ms B, with business duties in multiple African countries. The second manager was a 36-year-old male, Mr C, with responsibility for the Egyptian market. Both managers and Ms A travelled on business to China from 5 to 18 January 2020 (Figure [1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"}). Ms A and Ms B were in Guangzhou while Mr C went to Wuhan. The three travellers reunited on 18 January in Guangzhou for their return trip to Egypt. On 19 January, Mr C went to his workplace in Cairo with severe influenza-like symptoms, including fever and cough. Despite his obvious illness, Mr C worked in the office the whole day, sharing a workspace with three employees, including Ms A and a third Chinese manager, Mr D, age 37 years. On 20 January 20, Mr C was still ill with respiratory symptoms and fever and he isolated himself, given his history of recent travel to Wuhan. Ms B shared the same dwelling as Mr C and Mr D, but all three occupied different rooms. Ms B secured a service to disinfect the home and change the furniture, given the illness of Mr C. On 24 January 24, Ms B developed a fever, cough and sore throat, suggesting a respiratory illness. Mr D then fell ill with respiratory disease on an unspecified date. Ms A remained asymptomatic. In late January there were no coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) diagnostic tests available in Egypt. Ms B and Mr C returned to Guangzhou on 4 February 2020. Mr C recovered completely but Ms B suffered from persistent cough and was confirmed as a COVID-19 case on 11 February based on a reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction test in China. It seems likely that both Mr C and Ms B were the first COVID-19 cases in Egypt, although they were never registered in Egypt as cases, given their return to China.

![Timeline of early SARS-CoV-2 transmission in Egypt, 2020.](traa065fig1){#fig1}

Also on 11 February, the Cairo office was informed by their China office colleagues that all exposed employees should be tested for SARS-CoV-2. Mr D, Ms A and about 22 other employees received complete blood counts, chest X-rays and nasal and throat swabs for SARS-CoV-2 testing at the Egyptian Ministry of Health, which then had the capacity to do the testing. Mr D (the Chinese manager who shared the same house as the two afflicted managers who had returned to China, Ms B and Mr C) tested positive (Figure [1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"}). Mr D was completely asymptomatic and is the first documented COVID-19 case in Egypt. As of March, Ms A has remained uninfected and asymptomatic.

Discussion {#sec3}
==========

These cases illustrate the global dynamics of the coronavirus pandemic, in particular how modern business and air travel can transmit viral pathogens to far-distant venues.^[@bib6],[@bib7]^ Ms B did not travel to Wuhan, but was presumably infected by Mr C who did travel there (Mr C was a presumptive case, but remains unconfirmed). Mr D was exposed and infected in the shared dwelling or workplace but was asymptomatic. The heterogeneity of risk is highlighted by Ms A, who was exposed for prolonged periods to Mr C and Ms B during travel and at the workplace, but was never infected, as well as three other employees, also exposed for many hours in the workplace, but never infected (Figure [1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"}).

Although the reporting of early symptomatic cases was urged by the Egyptian Ministry of Health from the very start of the pandemic, unidentified cases---either symptomatic or asymptomatic---contributed substantially to further SARS-CoV-2 spread nationwide and abroad.^[@bib8]^ At a time of no local testing capacity, COVID-19 cases were imported to Egypt from China through global air travel.^[@bib9]^ Eventually the COVID-19 pandemic led to cessation of most international flights between afflicted countries, although it was too late to prevent global viral spread.^[@bib10]^ Egypt, Algeria and South Africa represented the highest importation risk of COVID-19 from China to Africa according to one modelling study of global travel patterns.^7^ Egypt stopped all flights in late March through 1 July and applied a night-time curfew to limit the spread in social groups. Despite early, aggressive and restrictive control measures, Egypt has experienced a transition from its first few cases to a severe upward spike with cumulative cases of \>70 000 (as of July 2020) after mass gatherings for festivals and loosened enforcement of physical distancing.[@bib12] More cases are emerging in Africa and the Middle East and these will burden underresourced hospitals and health systems, representing a special risk for the elderly and persons with pre-existing medical conditions.^[@bib3],[@bib4],[@bib13],[@bib14]^ The global community was not prepared for a pandemic respiratory disease threat on the magnitude of COVID-19, or novel influenza strains, least of all low- and middle-income countries.^[@bib15]^
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